inal proceedings. The most serious offenses are tried by general courts-martial composed of a judge and five or more jurors. 10 U.S.C. § 816(1) (Supp. V, 1970) . The penalties for offenses heard in general court are those provided in the statutes defining the offenses or are established by the President, id. § 856, and include tions of court-martial practice. Against the background of these legislative proposals, this article will evaluate the efficacy of one frequently suggested remedy for the ills of the military criminal legal process: the exclusion of certain categories of offenses from military jurisdiction.
When viewed from an historical perspective, proposals to modify the jurisdiction of military courts have not been infrequent. Legislative and judicial history readily illustrate that military criminal jurisdiction in the United States is something other than an immutable jurisdictional preserve. 9 The first legislative definition 0 of doimprisonment, fines, forfeiture of military salary, loss of military grade, punitive discharge from the armed forces, and capital punishment. Special courts-martial include a jury of three, id. § 816 (2), and may try any non-capital offense, id. § 819, but the penalty adjudged may not exceed confinement at hard labor for six months, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for six months.
Id. A punitive discharge may also be returned by the special court, but only if a verbatim record of trial is kept. Id. Summary courts-martial are composed of only one officer who serves as judge, jury, prosecution and defense counsel; he need not be legally trained. Id. § 816 (3); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 para. 79 (rev. ed. 1969 [Hereinafter cited as MCM 1969] . Limited like the special court-martial to non-capital offenses, the summary court may not return a sentence in excess of confinement at hard labor for 30 days, forfeiture of two-thirds of one months pay, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. V, 1970) . Use of the summary court-martial has declined in the past decade, see Annual Reports of the (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) ; and the Bayh legislation would eliminate this forum, Bayh Bill § § . Below this tripartite court system are administrative disciplinary measures, the "Article 15" or "Captains Mast," which are imposed by the offender's commanding officer without an evidentiary hearing. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964) . The sanctions possible here depend to some extent upon the grade and command position of the officer imposing punishment, but do not include confinement at hard labor nor the degree of sanctions possible in the summary court-martial. Id. The average rate per 1,000 for these various proceedings in the Army during the last quarter of 1970 was: general courts, 0.16; special courts, 1.79; summary courts, 0.92; Article 15, 2 A crime which is to the prejudice and good order of military discipline is defined as an act which must have been committed under such circumstances as to have directly offended against the government and discipline of the military state. Id. at 723-24. Early courts-martial also assumed jurisdiction of servicemen's domestic offenses when civilian courts declined to prosecute. Rice, O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Ma.'tial Jurisdiction, "Service Connection," Confusion and the Serviceman, 51 MIL. L. REv. 41, 51-54 (1971 23Id. at 272. Sergeant O'Callahan was convicted by court-martial for attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape. While off duty and in civilian clothes in Honolulu, the defendant had broken into a hotel room and attacked its occupant. In finding no "service connection," the court stressed that the defendant was properly on pass from his duty station at Fort Shafter, the offense was unrelated to the defendant's military duties, the offense did not occur on post, the victim had no connection with the military community, the regular civilian courts were open, the offense occurred domestically at peacetime, and the case involved no factor of defiance of military authority, security of a military post, or hazard to military property. Id. 26 The Relford factors are 1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base. 2. The crime's commission away from the base. 3. Its commission at a place not under military control. 4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a foreign country. 5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming from the war power. 6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the crime. created imposes a difficult task for courts which must apply it and promises varying results27 until authoritative case precedent develops. The present scope of court-martial jurisdiction of offenses committed by service personnel as defined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Supreme Court decisions, is subject to further limitation by two other sources. The first, an agreementss between the Departments of Defense and Justice, 29 provides for division of investigative and prosecutory responsibilities when a serviceman's crime is triable in both federal and military courts. As a general rule, offenses committed on base by servicemen against other persons residing on the base will be tried in military courts; major offenses against government prop-7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the military. 8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted. 9. The absence of any flouting of military authority. 10. The absence of any threat to a military post. 11. The absence of any violation of military property. One might add still another factor implicit in the others: 12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts. 401 U.S. at 365.
United States Court of MAfilitary Appeals and the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces and the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation
Corporal Relford was convicted by court-martial for rape and kidnapping on two separate occasions. Both transactions occurred within Fort Dix and McGmre Air Force Base while the defendant was off duty and in civilian clothes. His first victim was the visiting sister of another serviceman, the second the wife of a serviceman. The Supreme Court concluded that "service connection" elements 4, 6, 8, 11, 12 and possibly 5 and 9 tended to establish that Relford's offenses were not in military jurisdiction; the contrary was true of elements 1, 2, 3, 7 and 10. Id. at 366. Concluding with a very geographic emphasis, the court held "that when a serviceman is charged with an offense committed on or at the geographical boundary of a military post and violative of the security of a person or of property there, that offense may be tried by a court-martial...." Id. 28 Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, a member of the armed forces accused of an offense against civil authority may be delivered, upon request, to the civil authority for trial. 10 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1964 14 Id. at § 910.
[Vol. 63 the military community: the soldier who assaults his off-duty commanding officer in public on a military post has committed a far more socially disturbing delict that a non-military court is likely to recognize or punish. The Hatfield procposals, then, are nothing more than a facile but arbitrary alternative to the more demanding O'Callahan-Relford criteria which allocate particular offenses to the courts of the jurisdition most concerned with the offense.
In addition to being arbitrary in terms of classification, the Hatfield.proposals are also subject to question on a practical level. REv. 3, 72 (1970) . This argument against civilian jurisdiction of servicemen's offenses must first be discounted by the fact that the military survives though already sharing jurisdiction with civilian courts through the workings of O'Callahan, the status of forces agreements, and the understanding with the Justice Department. See text accompanying notes supra. Clearly there is no inherent reason why civilian court jurisdiction should unnecessarily entangle servicemen, for civilian judges could give calendar preference to military defendants and respond to the needs of military exigencies. Civilian jurisdiction might be subject to removal on showing of military need. See Comment, supra note 33 at 380. In the United Kingdom, British courts-martial and civilian courts share jurisdiction over almost all servicemen's offenses, and the final decision as to trial forum rests upon a cooperative evaluation of a variety of factors-reminis- is minor, he may not be entitled to appointed counsel in the civilian court,-and if the offense is punishable by no more than confinement for six months, he may receive no jury trial." In military practice, however, no matter how minor the offense, the defendant has a right, on request, to representation by a fully qualified lawyer and trial by a military jury. REv. 85, 111 (1971) . It is conceivable that the military could continue to provide free legal counsel to servicemen tried in civilian courts. Though presently military lawyers do not represent servicemen in civilian court proceedings, a pilot program is operating at three Army posts which provides Army counsel for servicemen in civilian criminal and civil cases providing 1) the serviceman is financially unable to retain his own counsel, and 2) civilian legal aid is unavailable. Army Times, January 20, 1971 at 4, col. 3. Cium. L. RRPTR. 3091 (U.S. January 27, 1971) .
4See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) . 815-16, 820, 827 (Supp. V, 1970 " Considering all these factors, a number of civilian critics of military practice have conceded that in many circumstances the military defendant facing trial for a "civilian" offense would be better served by a military court than its local, civilian counterpart. However there are estimated to be 27.5 million veterans in the United States (Chicago Daily News, February 27, 1971, at 16, col. 4) Rr.v. 201, 202 (1961 72 It would be possible for the federal government to provide financial resources or assistance for those civil jurisdictions assuming law enforcement responsibility for servicemen, see note 52 supra, but the Hatfield legislation makes no provision for this.
processes" would be strained further by an enlargement of their responsibilities. Thrown into domestic courts, cases with primary impact in the military community and beyond the ken and political sensitivity of local prosecutors and courts might become secondary to domestic business and be manipulated to serve parochial interestsY 4 Thus, the Supreme Court, in refusing to oust military courts and extend domestic jurisdiction to civilian type offenses occurring on a military post, commented in Relford:
The distinct possibility exists that civil courts... will have less than complete interest, concern and capacity for all the cases that vindicate the military's disciplinary problems within its own community.... Finally, with regard to offenses with primary impact in the military community, it is uncertain that non-military judges, administrators, and jurors possess sufficient insight into the problems of military society to render fitting judgementsy 6 In sum, further jurisdiction-shifting does not seem a very helpful technique for improving the level of justice for the serviceman or military society. The present jurisdictional frontiers provided in O'Callahan and Re/ford, though sometimes difficult to fnd, do quite rationally allocate servicemen's domestic offenses to trial in the military or civilian community most affected by the delict. Stripping the military of authority to try offenses with primary impact in its own community would place responsibility for such law enforcement in the unenthusiastic hands of those substantially unwilling and unable to execute it. A dubious advantage to the military defendant himself, a shift of all servicemen's civilian type offenses into domestic courts is a reformer's feint which would have no bearing on the great majority of defendants in military courts and the need to improve the legal processes therein.
